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CRAWFORD & BEYOND:
HOW FAR HAVE WE TRAVELED FROM
ROBERTS AFTER ALL?
Brooks Holland
I. INTRODUCTION
We have ridden the Crawford confrontation train for almost
eight years.1 In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled
2
Ohio v. Roberts, and “discarded the reliability framework that
had governed the admissibility of hearsay statements under the
Confrontation Clause for more than twenty years.”3 In place of
Roberts’ reliability framework, under which judges decided
which hearsay evidence to admit without cross-examination,
Crawford gave us a rule excluding “testimonial” hearsay at
trial.4
Assistant Professor and Gonzaga Law Foundation Scholar, Gonzaga
University School of Law. In addition to teaching law, the author represents
clients in criminal appeals before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and previously served as a public defender in the Bronx and
Manhattan. Laurel Yecny, a law student at Gonzaga, provided excellent
research assistance for this paper. Many thanks to the editors at the Journal
of Law and Policy for excellent editing.
1
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
2
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).
3
Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements Under Crawford: What Makes
Testimony . . . Testimonial?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 281 (2005)
[hereinafter Testimonial Statements]; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (rejecting
the argument that confrontation analysis can turn on “amorphous notions of
‘reliability’”).
4
See Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of,
by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37 (2008) (noting that in Crawford, “the Court shifted
from ‘reliability’ to an as yet undefined ‘testimonial’ test”); see also
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I boarded this Crawford train an enthusiastic passenger,5
believing that Crawford promised real change in confrontation
law to constrain trends such as “evidence-based” prosecutions—
where prosecutors proved cases largely through hearsay
evidence without producing the declarant.6 We just needed to
ride the Crawford train for a few more stops to learn precisely
what evidence would qualify as “testimonial.”7 In Michigan v.
Bryant,8 however, the Supreme Court returned to a multi-factor
judicial test for deciding whether cross-examination of a nontestifying declarant is needed, a test that resurrected the
relevance of “reliability.”9 Bryant thus put the brakes on the
Crawford train, and maybe even started its return to the Roberts
station.10
Following the Bryant decision, Brooklyn Law School hosted
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (introducing and explaining the concept of
“testimonial” evidence under the Confrontation Clause, and holding that the
confrontation right renders testimonial evidence inadmissible at trial absent an
opportunity to cross-examine).
5
See generally Testimonial Statements, supra note 3, at 281–95
(embracing Crawford’s basic “testimonial” framework for confrontation
analysis).
6
See McClure v. Rehg, No. 4:07CV1686 FRB, 2007 WL 3352389, at
*1 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (defining evidence-based prosecutions); Richard
Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1176–77 (2002) (exploring the growing trend of prosecutors
introducing witness statements to 911 and the police without calling the
witness at trial, particularly in domestic violence cases); Brooks Holland,
Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York: The
Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 175–79
(2002) (reviewing trend of prosecutors using hearsay to prosecute cases
without producing the victim to testify).
7
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”); see also Joelle Anne
Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause Legacy from Its
(Glorious) Beginnings to (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1212–13
(2011) (“[B]oth in and after Crawford, the Court has repeatedly refused to
provide clear or consistent criteria distinguishing testimonial statements from
the infinite range of out-of-court statements made by victims and witnesses
during criminal investigations.”).
8
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
9
See infra notes 34–49 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
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its most recent “Crawford and Beyond” symposium.11 The
learned presentations at this symposium prompted me to reflect
on the point of Crawford, and where Crawford perhaps should
have taken us. In the end, this reflection has made me more
sympathetic to Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s caution in
Crawford:
[T]housands of federal prosecutors and the tens of
thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to
what . . . is covered by the new rule. They need them
now, not months or years from now. Rules of criminal
evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the
country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this
12
manner.
Crawford did spawn years of doctrinal uncertainty, an
uncertainty that persists to date.13 These were good years for law
professors,14 but difficult ones for lawyers and judges. If this
protracted uncertainty was necessary to bring criminal practice
into harmony with an important constitutional principle, lawyers
and judges needed to tough it out. But, if this uncertainty merely
11

Brooklyn Law School has hosted three fantastic symposia exploring
Crawford and subsequent Confrontation Clause developments. See
Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005);
Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue, 15 J.L. & POL’Y
333 (2007).
12
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75–76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
13
See Jeffery Fisher, What Happened—and What is Happening—to the
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 589 (2007) (“We have entered a
brave new world of confrontation jurisprudence in which virtually no judges
have experience applying even its basic governing principles.”); Moreno,
supra note 7, at 1212, 1213 (noting that Crawford “generated a flurry of
activity in the federal and state courts,” and “[w]ithout clear guidance, the
lower courts have generated confused and inconsistent confrontation
decisions”). As of January 18, 2012, Westlaw Keycite lists 10,416 court
decisions citing to Crawford—an average of more than 2,000 judicial citations
a year since Crawford was decided in March of 2004. By contrast, Westlaw
Keycite lists 2,759 judicial citations to Roberts from 1980 to March 2004,
before Crawford was decided.
14
As of January 18, 2012, Westlaw Keycite lists 1,346 law review
citations to Crawford. Westlaw Keycite lists 678 law review citations to
Roberts between 1980 and March 2004.
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resulted from the Supreme Court’s experimentation with
different confrontation theories, only to return the law close to
where it began, the real world of law may have benefitted from
a bit more respect for stare decisis.
This Essay will examine where this Crawford project took us,
where it should have taken us instead, and whether the trip was
worthwhile. Part II of this paper traces how the Crawford-DavisBryant trajectory of decisions regarding “testimonial” evidence
effectively returns us to Roberts—or perhaps to an even more
narrow conception of confrontation rights than under Roberts. Part
III outlines how confrontation rights could have been understood
consistent with our modern adversary system of criminal
adjudication, and where I believed the Crawford train was destined
when it departed eight years ago. Part IV concludes that if the
Supreme Court was not prepared to deliver confrontation law to an
important and new constitutional principle through Crawford’s
wholesale revision of existing doctrine, the Court should have
heeded Chief Justice Rehnquist’s call for restraint.
II. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE: A TURN BACK TO ROBERTS
The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”15 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause to include a right
to face-to-face confrontation with accusers as sworn witnesses
before the trier of fact, and a right to cross-examine those
witnesses.16 Roberts, however, held that this right could be
satisfied when the prosecution introduced hearsay evidence from
a non-testifying declarant, so long as the evidence proved
sufficiently reliable. The prosecution could demonstrate this
reliability by showing that the evidence either fell within a
“firmly-rooted” hearsay exception or contained judicially17
determined guarantees of trustworthiness.
15

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990) (reviewing
confrontation jurisprudence dating to the nineteenth century).
17
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
16
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Crawford rejected Roberts’ “amorphous, if not entirely
subjective”18 reliability framework for confrontation. In the
Crawford Court’s view, “[d]ispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with
jury trial because the defendant is obviously guilty.”19 Thus, the
Court concluded, the prosecution may not introduce testimonial
evidence against a defendant without producing the declarant for
cross-examination, “unless the declarant [is] unavailable and the
defendant[] had a prior opportunity [for cross-examination].”20
The question became what evidence the Court would count
as testimonial, and therefore subject to Crawford’s rule of
exclusion. Relying on historical reference points, Crawford
included testimony given at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, and during a former trial, as well as statements
given during a precinct police interrogation.21 The Court “[left]
for another day,” however, the task of “spell[ing] out a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”22
The Court next undertook this task in Davis v. Washington.23
Davis involved two separate domestic violence cases. Prior to
Crawford, prosecutors frequently employed excited utterances
and other hearsay evidence to prove domestic violence cases
without producing the victim-declarant.24 In Davis, the victim
called 911 and said that Davis had assaulted her and fled the
location.25 In a companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, the police
responded to the victim’s home following a domestic disturbance
18

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
Id. at 62.
20
See id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands . . . unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”); see also Fisher, supra note 13, at 587–88 (explaining that
Crawford “prohibits the prosecution from introducing out-of-court
‘testimonial’ statements unless the declarants are unavailable and defendants
had a prior opportunity to cross examine them”).
21
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
22
Id.
23
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
24
See id. at 817, 819; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 6,
at 1180–81 (commenting in 2002 on the admissibility of 911 calls in domestic
violence cases, two years before the Crawford decision).
25
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–19.
19
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report.26 The police separated the victim and Hammon, and the
victim told the police that Hammon had assaulted her.27 The
victims did not testify at trial, and the defendants argued that the
victims’ out-of-court statements were “testimonial” under
Crawford, thus precluding their admission absent crossexamination.28
In resolving the confrontation challenges to these two
instances of hearsay evidence, the Court split the outcome: the
declarant’s statement to 911 in Davis was ruled nontestimonial,29 but the victim’s statement to the responding
officers in Hammon was deemed testimonial.30 Thus, under
Crawford, no confrontation was required at all in Davis—the
State was free to prove Davis’ guilt through the 911 record
without cross-examination of the declarant or any other
confrontation requirement. In Hammon, however, crossexamination was mandated, or else the declarant’s statement had
to be excluded from trial.
This critical constitutional line was demarcated by a new
confrontation test that the Court articulated to refine Crawford’s
incomplete definition of testimonial evidence:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.31
This test and its application in Davis left several questions
unresolved about the definition of “testimonial” evidence.32 But
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See id. at 819–21.
See id.
See id. at 818–19, 821.
See id. at 828–29.
See id. at 830–31.
Id. at 822.
These questions included what distinguishes an “ongoing emergency”
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Davis did appear to answer one question: analysis of whether
hearsay evidence is “testimonial” under the Confrontation
Clause is completely removed from the lawyers, witnesses, and
arguments in the courtroom where that hearsay evidence is being
offered.33 Instead, the Court divined whether the declarants’
statements proved testimonial in Davis and Hammon by looking
solely to the “primary purpose” of the exchange between the
declarant and the police at the time and place of those
statements, many months before the trial.
Bryant reaffirmed this pre-trial focal point of the Crawford
confrontation framework. In Bryant, the police encountered the
declarant lying in the street after being shot.34 The police asked
the declarant “what had happened, who had shot him, and where
the shooting had occurred.”35 The declarant answered that
“Rick” shot him.36 The declarant also gave a time, location, and
brief description of the shooting.37 The declarant died later that

from an investigation of past events, and whose perspective bears on the
“primary purpose” of the investigation: the declarant’s, the police officer’s,
or both. See generally, e.g., Fisher, supra note 13, at 617–18 (questioning
predictability of Davis’ objective test for assessing the primary purpose of an
interrogation); Richard Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15
J.L. & POL’Y 553, 561–63 (2007) (arguing that Davis should be understood
to analyze evidence from the perspective of the declarant, not the police or a
combination of parties to a conversation); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A
Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss, 15 J.L. &
POL’Y 725, 728–35 (2007) (questioning how Davis’ “binary” emergency-past
events framework will apply accurately in domestic violence cases).
33
The Court in Crawford did limit its confrontation rule to hearsay
evidence offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). But the Court made clear that
hearsay evidence and testimonial evidence should be defined separately. See
id. at 51.
34
See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). For a thorough
examination of the factual record in Bryant, see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
Michigan v. Bryant: The Counter-Revolution Begins 2–6 (UCLA Sch. of Law,
Research Paper No. 11-07, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798
877.
35
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36
Id.
37
Id.
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morning.38 At Bryant’s subsequent murder trial, the court
admitted the declarant’s statements to the police into evidence as
excited utterances.39
On appeal, Bryant argued that admission of the declarant’s
statements identifying the shooter violated Crawford because he
could not cross-examine the declarant at trial.40 The Supreme
Court disagreed, finding the declarant’s statements nontestimonial. In the process, the Court used this case as an
opportunity to “provide additional clarification of what Davis
meant by ‘the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’”41
As in Davis, the Court in Bryant looked solely to the time and
place of the exchange between the declarant and the police to
determine whether the declarant’s statements were testimonial.
The Court sought in this exchange objective proof of either a
crime investigation, which would require confrontation later at
trial, or an emergency, in which case the purpose of the
questioning “is not to create a record for trial and thus is not
within the scope of the Clause.”42 The Court employed a multifactor judicial test to identify the objective primary purpose of the
exchange.43 This test considers the statements, actions, and
perspectives of both the police and the declarant when the pretrial statement was procured.44 Moreover, “standard rules of
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be
relevant.”45 In particular, the Court analogized the newly-minted
38

See id.
See id. at 1150–51 & n.1.
40
See id. at 1150–51.
41
Id. at 1156.
42
Id. at 1155.
43
Commentators have extracted anywhere from eight to a dozen potential
factors to be considered under the Bryant test. See Michael D. Cicchini,
Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1301, 1309–10 (2011) (identifying, for example, the formality of the
interrogation producing the declarant’s statement, whether a weapon was used
during the alleged crime, the medical condition of the declarant, as well as
other factors); Graham, supra note 34, at 28; Moreno, supra note 7, at 1245.
44
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160–61.
45
Id. at 1155.
39
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emergency-investigation distinction in confrontation law to the
“logic . . . justifying the excited utterance exception in hearsay
law,”46 because “[a]n ongoing emergency has a similar effect of
focusing an individual’s attention on responding to the
emergency,”47 rather than on fabricating evidence.48 Thus, “the
Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be
subject to the crucible of cross-examination.”49
One commentator recently complained that after Bryant, the
Confrontation Clause is “dead again.”50 Bryant certainly returns
confrontation law to a malleable judicial test that invites judges to
decide whether out-of-court statements inspire sufficient
confidence to dispense with cross-examination at trial.51 Nor does
the Court’s recent confrontation jurisprudence hint at impending
limits to the pro-admission trajectory that Bryant sets. The sixJustice Bryant majority included the four vocal dissenters from
two recent confrontation decisions that did apply Crawford’s rule
46

Id. at 1157.
Id.
48
See id. (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990)).
49
Id. at 1157.
50
Cicchini, supra note 43, at 1302–04 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause, for
all practical purposes, died in 1980 with the Court’s decision in Ohio v.
Roberts,” and following Davis and Bryant, “[t]he Confrontation Clause is
dead again.”).
51
Cf. Graham, supra note 34, at 1, 29–30 (arguing that Bryant
“effectively overruled Crawford and pushed confrontation doctrine back in
the direction of Roberts,” and the “majority’s analysis of the exception for
excited utterances demonstrates the lengths they will go to aid prosecutors”);
Marc Chase McAllister, Evading Confrontation: From One Amorphous
Standard to Another, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 492–93 (2011) (observing
that Bryant’s totality-of-circumstances test “is strikingly reminiscent of the
discredited Roberts framework” and “makes case results unpredictable and
provides easy means for courts to dispense with actual confrontation”
(citations omitted)); Moreno, supra note 7, at 1218 (“Bryant will lead to the
admission of more prosecutor-sponsored statements that defendants cannot
exclude from witnesses whom defendants cannot confront,” and “will almost
inevitably exacerbate the problem of erratic and inconsistent decisions.”);
Jason Widdison, Comment, Michigan v. Bryant, The Ghost of Roberts and
the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 230 (2011) (contending that
Bryant undermined Crawford “by reintroducing reliability to the Court’s
Sixth Amendment analysis”).
47
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of exclusion: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,52 and Bullcoming
v. New Mexico.53 Those dissents evince that, to these Justices,
confrontation is a flexible right that ensures “a fair trial with
reliable evidence.”54 Thus, in these Justices’ view, Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming improperly “treated the reliability of evidence as
a reason to exclude it.”55 Four Justices consequently appear
committed to the core principle of Roberts: judges may dispense
with a defendant’s right to confrontation on a finding that a nontestifying declarant likely did not fabricate a pre-trial statement.
Justice Clarence Thomas, by comparison, consistently has
supported a very narrow definition of testimonial evidence,
including only formal, solemnized pre-trial statements.56 In total,
therefore, five current Justices could vote for broad admission of
hearsay evidence without cross-examination at trial. Regardless of
how aggressively Bryant’s author, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, will
push her primary purpose test,57 evidence-based prosecutions
easily may become prevalent again.
If anyone doubts the elasticity built into Bryant, one need
52

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). The dissenters in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming included
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer,
and Samuel Alito.
54
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55
Id.
56
See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the “primary purpose” test as “‘an exercise in fiction’
that is ‘disconnected from history’ and ‘yields no predictable results’”
(quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835, 838–39 (2006) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
57
Justice Sotomayor joined the Court subsequent to the Davis decision.
She concurred separately in Bullcoming, listing several nuanced “factual
scenarios” not presented by the expert report admitted in Bullcoming. See
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2721–23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Whether she
will switch sides from Bullcoming according to one of these factual scenarios
may be revealed this term in Williams v. Illinois. Williams v. Illinois, 939
N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No.
10-8337). Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in Bryant, and she joined the
Bullcoming opinion only in part. Justice Kagan thus may not have voted yet
in a manner that fully reveals her views on confrontation.
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only consider the decision in United States v. Solorio.58 Solorio
was charged with selling drugs to a confidential informant
during an undercover “buy bust” operation.59 During the
informant’s purchase of drugs, two undercover DEA agents
observed the interactions between the informant and Solorio, and
radioed their observations to the arrest team.60 The arrest team
agents did not observe these events. At trial, the Government
did not call the two officers who personally observed the
informant and Solorio interact.61 Instead, “for reasons not
explained in the record,”62 the Government called arrest team
agents to testify to the radioed surveillance observations of the
non-testifying agents.63 The trial court admitted these hearsay
statements as a present sense impression.64
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Solorio argued that these statements were
testimonial and therefore inadmissible under Crawford, absent
cross-examination. Invoking Bryant, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The court accepted the Government’s argument that the nontestifying agents “communicated their observations to the other
agents to ensure the success and safety of the operation, by
assuring that all agents involved knew what was happening and
enabling them to gauge their actions accordingly.”65 Thus, the
court observed, “objectively assessed, the ‘primary purpose’ of
the agents’ statements was assuring that the arrest effort both
succeeded and did not escalate into a dangerous situation, not ‘to
create a record for trial.’”66 The court accordingly held that
“‘the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to
be subject to the crucible of cross-examination,’” because “‘the
58

United States v. Solorio, No. 10-10304, 2012 WL 161843 (9th Cir.
Jan. 19, 2012).
59
Id. at *1–2.
60
Id. at *1–2, 4–5.
61
Id. at *4–5.
62
Id. at *7.
63
Id. at *4–5.
64
Id. at *4. The trial court did not rule on a confrontation objection to
this evidence. See id. at *4 n.6.
65
Id. at *7.
66
Id. at *8 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011)).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

528

prospect of fabrication’ in statements” given for this purpose is
presumably “‘significantly diminished.’”67
The Solorio decision’s underlying rationale was not limited
by unique case-specific facts, and instead relied on facts
common to most undercover operations. Undercover operations
of every kind present risks of danger or failure. Through this
decision, therefore, Bryant appears to have gifted prosecutors
with a fairly broad template for trying undercover operations
without subjecting key witnesses to cross-examination.
Defendants instead will confront only the recipients of hearsay
statements about alleged criminal activity, so long as those
statements, in the trial judge’s opinion, objectively were made
“to ensure the success and safety of the operation.”68
Crawford thus has followed a round-trip trajectory since its
departure in 2004. From an early promise of robust protection of
confrontation rights at trial, Crawford has circled back to an easilynarrowed conception of confrontation, authorizing judges to decide
when cross-examination—or any other confrontation priority—must
be preserved. Indeed, Crawford may conceive of confrontation
even more narrowly than Roberts did, because outside of
testimonial evidence, Crawford attaches no confrontation interests
to hearsay evidence.69 Roberts, by contrast, extended confrontation
interests to hearsay evidence broadly.70 As a result, if Roberts did
“kill” confrontation thirty years ago, confrontation post-Bryant may
be “dead again”—or even more dead.71
67

Id. (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157).
Id. at *7.
69
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); David Alan
Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 2009, at
1, 5 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2010) (“[T]he Court has made clear
that the introduction of nontestimonial statements raises no constitutional
concerns, no matter how the statements are treated under the hearsay rule.”);
Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause 1, 3, 5 (S.
Methodist Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 84, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956748 (noting that the constriction of testimonial
evidence following Davis and Bryant excludes a wide range of hearsay
evidence from confrontation protection).
70
See Bellin, supra note 69, at 9 (“Roberts treated testimonial and
nontestimonial statements identically.”).
71
Cicchini, supra note 43, at 1302–04.
68
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III. WHERE CRAWFORD COULD HAVE TAKEN CONFRONTATION: A
TRIAL RIGHT IN AN ADVERSARY PROCESS
One commentator has pinned this trajectory of confrontation
law on an “ill-advised attempt by Justice Scalia to fashion the
confrontation clause in a manner only he, if anyone, is willing
to accept as fundamentally sound and consistent in history,
logic, and practice.”72 Yet Justice Scalia persuaded a majority of
the Court to join his confrontation project, even if that train now
has derailed.73 On reflection, however, that train was destined to
derail, because Crawford’s framework inevitably encouraged
judges to narrow confrontation rights to avoid Crawford’s harsh
exclusionary rule.74 If the Confrontation Clause ultimately must
permit discretionary judicial decision making, better that
discretion apply to how to enforce that right, not to the
definition of the right itself. By treating confrontation more
accurately as a trial right in an adversary process, the Court
could have realized this balance from Crawford.
Crawford observed that the Confrontation Clause “applies to
‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear
testimony.’”75 The Court explained further that “‘[t]estimony,’ in
turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”76 If, however,
“testimonial” evidence is the lynchpin for whether a declarant is a
“witness” to be confronted, the Court has not adequately explained
why it looks solely to the time and place of a pre-trial statement to
determine whether it proves “testimonial,” and does not consider
the trial purpose for which the prosecuting lawyer offers that
evidence as the more accurate measure of the statement’s purpose.
I assume that the Court’s focus on out-of-court facts in
72

6 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
802:2.2 (7th ed. 2011).
73
Justice Scalia made quite clear in his Bryant dissent that the Court has
mutated, if not destroyed, his original confrontation project. See Bryant, 131
S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s opinion distorts our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.”).
74
See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
75
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
76
Id.
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defining testimonial evidence results from Crawford’s heavy
historical emphasis on the founding era, when criminal trials did
not involve institutionalized prosecution and defense bars
marshaling and challenging evidence in an adversary system.77
Focus on the primary purpose of evidence when it was gathered
during an investigation might be more meaningful in a “civil-law
mode of criminal procedure.”78 But in the 21st century criminal
justice system, a trial lawyer’s purpose in admitting evidence
defines the precise nature of that evidence.79 Therefore, it makes
marginal sense to judge whether a hearsay declarant has borne
witness against a defendant at trial by inspecting solely the
procurement of the declarant’s statement by the police, months
or years prior to the trial.80
The Court in Davis acknowledged that criminal procedure
institutions and practices have changed since the founding era,
and that these changes should inform how courts evaluate
77

See id. at 42–50.
Id. at 50; cf. Thomas Davies, Not the “Framers’ Design”: How the
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause,
15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 355, 365–68 (2007) (criticizing the Crawford opinion’s
reliance on originalist methodology because it “fail[s] to grasp—or admit—the
degree to which legal doctrine and legal institutions have changed since the
framing”).
79
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (barring introduction of evidence of a
character trait or prior act in order to prove propensity, but permitting
introduction of that same evidence if offered to prove, for example, motive or
modus operandi); FED. R. EVID. 407 (barring introduction of subsequent
remedial measures to prove, inter alia, negligence, but permitting it for other
purposes, such as impeachment); FED. R. EVID. 801 (barring the admission
of out-of-court statements if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but
permitting their introduction for other purposes, such as their effect on the
listener).
80
Cf. Testimonial Statements, supra note 3, at 284 (questioning the
“view [of confrontation that] focuses on the circumstances surrounding an
out-of-court statement instead of the trial at which it is offered, which for
confrontation purposes may be asking the wrong question”). Professor
Josephine Ross has advocated a comparable position. See Josephine Ross,
After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and
“Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147,
196–209 (2006).
78
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whether evidence is testimonial.81 Yet the Court erred when it
asserted that, as a result of those changes, we “no longer have
examining Marian magistrates,”82 but “we do have, as our 18thcentury forebears did not, examining police officers.”83 In our
modern criminal justice system, we have investigating police
officers prior to trial; at trial, where confrontation applies, we
have “examining” prosecuting lawyers.
Confrontation law should reflect this reality, where the intent
of prosecuting lawyers, not of declarants and the police, defines
the nature of trial evidence. An old evidence law cliché
illustrates this distinction. A lawyer presents a plate of spaghetti
to a witness.84 The spaghetti is not offered to prove something
about that plate of spaghetti. Rather, the spaghetti is offered to
refresh the witness’ memory of some fact, or to test whether the
witness can recognize spaghetti. The law thus does not evaluate
when, where, why, and by whom that spaghetti was prepared in
deciding whether the spaghetti may be offered, because the
lawyer is not attempting to prove a fact about that particular
plate of spaghetti—it is simply an object to trigger memory, or
to test perception. If, however, the lawyer at trial offers that
same plate of spaghetti as the plate of spaghetti at issue in the
case, the law will condition the spaghetti’s admissibility on a
showing of authenticity and chain of custody. The point is, how
lawyers marshal and use evidence at trial determines what the
evidence is in that trial—whether that same plate of spaghetti is
just a physical object to awaken memory, a plate of spaghetti to
test perception, or the plate of spaghetti subject to litigation at
trial. The “objective primary purpose” with which the spaghetti
originally was prepared cannot alone define the purpose for
which the trial lawyer has offered the spaghetti as trial evidence.
81

See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006) (“Restricting
the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally
directed is a recipe for its extinction.”).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Cf., e.g., Jennifer Brown, Cross-Examining the Difficult Witness: Tips
for Women Defenders Navigating Gender Dynamics in the Courtroom,
CHAMPION, Apr. 2011, at 20, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.
aspx?id=16224.
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Similarly, when a court considers whether a hearsay
statement supplies testimonial evidence, the objective primary
purpose of that statement when it was made reveals little about
whether the declarant has borne witness at the later trial when it
is introduced. Imagine a witness who testified before a grand
jury, all with the clear objective purpose of establishing facts for
a future trial. This sounds like a good case for testimonial
evidence under Crawford.85 But the prosecutor at trial offers that
grand jury testimony only to show that this witness testified
before a grand jury, not to prove any facts asserted by that
testimony. The grand jury testimony should not constitute
“testimonial” evidence as used in this trial, regardless of its
primary purpose when created, because the lawyer offering it
did not attempt to prove any fact from those statements.86
By contrast, consider a person who comments casually about
a fact to a friend at a party. Under Crawford itself, let alone
Davis and Bryant, this statement seems a weak candidate for
testimonial evidence87—and properly so if we are asking solely
whether the person “testified” at the time and place of the casual
comment to the friend. But if the prosecutor offers this statement
at trial to prove the fact expressed in this statement, the
prosecutor has employed the statements as testimonial evidence
at trial. Regardless of the primary purpose of the statement
when made, at trial the prosecutor has offered it to prove this
fact as true and accurate according to the declarant.88
The Court has acknowledged this important investigationtrial dichotomy in confrontation analysis, recognizing that
85

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that
“testimonial” covers prior testimony before a grand jury).
86
See id. at 51 (testimony involves “[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
87
See id. (“An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence
and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. . . .
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.”).
88
See id.
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confrontation is a trial right and not a right against police abuses
during investigation.89 An exigency can alter whether a search
proves reasonable, because Fourth Amendment rights arise at
the time of the search.90 Whether a pre-trial statement addresses
an emergency or anything else, however, does not determine
how a prosecuting lawyer has employed that evidence at a later
trial, consistent with the trial right of confrontation. Yet the
Court still fixates on the interaction between the police and the
declarant in deciding whether that evidence is testimonial at the
later trial. And for some reason, the existence of an emergency
when a statement is made predetermines that the prosecution
cannot employ it as testimonial evidence at trial. The
Constitution locks evidence into testimonial or non-testimonial
form months or years before the trial even begins.
Crawford thus inexplicably authorizes declarants and the
police, not the trial lawyers, to dictate whether evidence at trial
operates as testimony. A single word from an important passage
in Bryant reveals this failure in confrontation analysis, but a
simple revision can resolve it. In Bryant, the Court held that
confrontation rights extend to statements “procured with a
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.”91 I would embrace this statement if it instead
extended confrontation rights to statements “[introduced at trial]
with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for
trial testimony.” Whatever history may say about 16th- and
17th-century criminal procedure abuses, in my experience this
modified statement from Bryant more accurately reflects how
lawyers and judges define evidence in criminal trials today. The
Constitution should not defy the reality of how contemporary
92
criminal cases are tried.
89

See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006) (“The
Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial
use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements
which offends that provision.”).
90
See generally Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
91
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (emphasis added).
92
Cf. Graham, supra note 34, at 30–31 (criticizing Bryant for ignoring
the investigation-trial dichotomy in confrontation analysis); Ross, supra note
80, at 196–201 (proposing that “‘[t]estimonial’ should mean statements that
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When I advanced this vision of testimonial evidence at the
recent Crawford and Beyond symposium, a participant inquired
whether I meant to define all hearsay evidence as testimonial
and thus subject to Crawford’s rule of exclusion.93 To me, this
question implicates two considerations.
First, my understanding of testimonial evidence may track
closely to the definition of hearsay. But I do not perceive this
relationship as a flaw. Like confrontation doctrine, the hearsay
rule also concerns itself with the opportunity to cross-examine.94
And the intent of the examining lawyer at trial largely guides the
court in judging whether evidence constitutes hearsay, not the
“objective purpose” of the declarant and interrogator in creating
the evidence.95 Perhaps the Confrontation Clause could best be
understood as the inverse of the confrontation view, embraced in
Roberts and rejected in Crawford, that “[the Confrontation
Clause’s] application to out-of-court statements introduced at

function as testimony during the trial,” not statements that function as
testimony at the time and place of evidence production). Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, the Confrontation Clause is not concerned
with whether a defendant had any opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
when the out-of-court statement was made, only when the evidence is offered
at trial. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (“[T]he inability
to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot
easily be shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is
assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial.”).
Whether that evidence necessitates confrontation thus should be defined by its
use at trial, where the right to cross-examine exists.
93
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth
Amendment’s core concerns.”).
94
See generally United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir.
1986), overruled on other grounds, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (“The reliability
concerns of the rule against hearsay have been satisfied when ‘the
witness . . . is subject to cross-examination.’”(quoting United States v. Fiore,
443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971))).
95
See United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“[W]hether a statement is hearsay . . . will most often hinge on the purpose
for which it is offered.”). For an examination of prosecution arguments for
offering trial evidence “not for the truth of the matter asserted,” see Jeffrey
L. Fisher, The Truth About the “Not for the Truth” Exception to Crawford,
CHAMPION, Feb. 2008, at 18.
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trial depends upon ‘the law of Evidence for the time being.’”96
Instead, the Confrontation Clause simply could constrain the
State from legislating or adjudicating policy exceptions to trial
cross-examination of a hearsay declarant in criminal cases. Some
commentators have argued that Crawford should have subjected
more hearsay to confrontation limitations.97 This approach even
may have a stronger historical basis than Crawford’s focus on
“testimonial” evidence.98
More than tracking hearsay law, however, my suggested
approach may bring testimonial evidence under the Sixth
Amendment closer to the meaning and role of testimonial
evidence under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause:99
an assertion that the prosecuting lawyer has introduced to prove
a fact against the accused at the trial itself.100 But regardless of
96

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51.
See, e.g., John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How
Crawford v. Washington Denies Defendants a Consistent Confrontation
Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 211–15 (2011); cf. Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of
Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 615–23 (2005) (advocating
confrontation framework for “accusatory hearsay”).
98
See Davies, supra note 78, at 352, 434 (explaining that, contrary to
Crawford’s historical position, “the framing-era sources indicate that the
confrontation right itself prohibited the use of hearsay statements as evidence
of the defendant’s guilt,” and “[a]dmitting unsworn, ‘nontestimonial’ hearsay
was not part of ‘the Framers’ design’”).
99
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”).
100
See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (“[T]o be
testimonial, an accused communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly,
relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”); Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (“Martinez was never made to be a ‘witness’
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause because his statements were never admitted as testimony against him
in a criminal case.” (emphasis added)); cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 590–91 (1990) (finding defendant’s response to police questions nontestimonial, because the prosecutor introduced this evidence to show
defendant’s physically slurred speech, not to prove defendant’s knowledge,
thoughts, or beliefs); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified
Theory of Testimonial Evidence under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2007) (examining definitional differences of
“testimonial” between the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and
97
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whether confrontation law defines testimonial evidence separately
from hearsay evidence, as Crawford and Davis indicated it
should,101 confrontation rights should turn on the prosecuting
lawyer’s purpose for that evidence at trial, not the objective
purpose for which that evidence was procured during the
investigation.102
Second, concern about a broad definition of testimonial
evidence that tracks hearsay law, I suspect, reacts to Crawford’s
rule of exclusion, which can transform confrontation rights into a
perceived “windfall” for defendants.103 Professor Robert Mosteller
presciently predicted the response to this perception following
Crawford:
Crawford places a bold “stop sign” in the way of the
admission of statements in this core area when
confrontation is not provided. Given the damaging impact
on prosecutions—a “stop sign” for the statement if it is
testimonial—tremendous pressure will be placed on courts
to narrow the definition [of testimonial evidence].104

the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and advancing a unified theory
of testimonial evidence).
Of course, under the Fifth Amendment, courts do analyze the
circumstances surrounding how the police procured a suspect’s statement in
determining its admissibility. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301
(1980) (defining interrogation to include “any words or actions on the part of
the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect”). But this analysis does not address
whether the suspect’s statement is testimonial. Rather, unlike the
Confrontation Clause, the Fifth Amendment also concerns itself with whether
the police obtained a statement through coercive pretrial interrogation,
necessitating analysis of these pretrial circumstances in addition to whether
the statement constitutes testimonial evidence in its use at trial.
101
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); Crawford, 541
U.S. at 51.
102
Cf. Cicchini, supra note 43, at 1320–21 (“The inquiry should not be on
the facts and circumstances of how a hearsay statement was allegedly made . . . .
Nor should it be on how a hearsay statement was allegedly collected . . . . [T]he
proper inquiry to determine whether a statement is testimonial involves the
statement’s use at trial.”); Ross, supra note 80, at 196–201.
103
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
104
Mosteller, supra note 97, at 516.
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As I indicated at the Crawford and Beyond symposium, I am not
sold on Crawford’s absolute rule of exclusion not only for the
practical reason suggested by Professor Mosteller, but also in
my understanding of trial confrontation generally.
In my experience trying criminal cases, the confrontation
right is not best understood as a “stop sign” against a narrow
class of evidence. Rather, confrontation is part of an adversary
process designed to ensure a fair trial.105 In this process, the
prosecution carries the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, but both sides are represented by competent counsel
before a judicial officer and unbiased jury. From this processfocused view should flow a broadly-defined trial right connected
to a realistic set of confrontation priorities, not an exclusionary
rule that eliminates only a very narrow range of evidence.
Crawford hitched confrontation’s wagon to an exclusionary
rule without clearly defining the right itself. A narrowed
confrontation right inevitably followed. Many defendants now
are left with no exclusionary rule or any other confrontation
interest to assert when hearsay is admitted from a non-testifying
declarant, because only a limited class of testimonial evidence
implicates confrontation rights.106 Instead of placing a
constitutional “stop sign” before testimonial evidence, Crawford
should have been understood to introduce a series of important
confrontation priorities—priorities that frame confrontation less
as a rule of evidence admissibility and more as a critical
ingredient to a fair adversarial trial.
The first priority is that the prosecution should produce for
105

Cf. Testimonial Statements, supra note 3, at 285 (defining
“testimony” in light of its role in a process of criminal adjudication).
106
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Sklansky, supra note 69, at 1, 5
(“[T]he Court has made clear that the introduction of nontestimonial
statements raises no constitutional concerns, no matter how the statements are
treated under the hearsay rule.”); cf. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing
Confrontation after Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 288–325 (2006)
(reconceptualizing confrontation as a policy issue, and proposing legislative
reforms to protect confrontation interests excluded from Crawford and
Davis); Bellin, supra note 69, at 1, 3, 5 (noting that the constriction of
testimonial evidence following Davis and Bryant excludes a wide range of
hearsay evidence from confrontation protection, and advocating that
confrontation rights extend to limit the use of non-testimonial hearsay).
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cross-examination any available witness whose pre-trial
statement is being offered “for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact” against the defendant.107 Availability is key.
The prosecution should not be able to choose, by stratagem or
lack of diligence, whether a defendant cross-examines the
sources of testimonial evidence.108 This prosecutorial practice, in
my experience, supplied the most widespread confrontation
problems under Roberts, and now perhaps under Crawford and
Bryant.109 A confrontation rule that constrains this practice would
do a lot more to ensure fair criminal trials today than would a
historically pure vision of 17th-century abuses.
If a prosecution can show true unavailability of a declarant,
however, the prosecution has not elected to deprive the
defendant of cross-examination.110 Unavailability begins to
implicate legitimate concerns for both necessity and equity in an
adversary process. Crawford thus identifies the next
confrontation priority: where cross-examination at trial is not
possible, the prosecution should give the defendant a pre-trial
opportunity to examine the declarant.111 Rarely will this pre-trial
107

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
See, e.g., United States v. Solorio, No. 10-10304, 2012 WL 161843,
at *7–8 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012).
109
See, e.g., Testimonial Statements, supra note 3. I do not mean to
suggest that prosecutors never have good reasons for proceeding in this
manner. In many domestic violence cases, for example, prosecutors face
challenges in producing the victim for trial, challenges that may reflect the
defendant’s misconduct. See generally Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the
Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367–74 (1996) (exploring difficulties
in prosecution); Thomas L. Kirsch, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should
Victims Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 392–98 (2001) (reviewing challenges). I
am arguing only that the prosecution should not be able to choose whether a
defendant confronts a prosecution witness at trial, a choice I have witnessed
prosecutors make in numerous cases.
110
For an example of unavailability, see Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490,
495 (2011).
111
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. For insightful questions and comments
about prior opportunities to cross-examine under Crawford, see Richard
Friedman, Opportunity for Cross-Examination at Preliminary Proceedings,
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Aug. 29, 2007), http://confrontationright.blogspot.
108
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cross-examination, such as cross-examination at a preliminary
hearing,112 substitute fully for defense counsel’s trial
examination.113 Yet even Crawford accepts this practical
compromise, rather than the exclusion of evidence, to maintain a
fair adversary process.114
Working beyond cross-examination as the sole measure of
confrontation, Crawford recognizes another confrontation
priority: if the prosecution could not afford a defendant any
opportunity for cross-examination, even prior to trial, the
defendant cannot complain about the loss of cross-examination in
cases where the defendant wrongfully caused the declarant’s
unavailability.115 The Court has drawn this “forfeiture” exception
to confrontation from history, but the Court also has noted that
it is grounded in necessity and equity.116 Surely, a defendant
cannot purposefully absent a witness from trial and complain
about an unfair adversary process.117
At this point, if the defendant could not cross-examine the
declarant and did not make the declarant unavailable, Crawford
would prioritize the exclusion of testimonial evidence. This
evidentiary “stop sign,” however, understandably may have
prompted members of the Court to curb the confrontation right
itself by defining testimonial evidence narrowly.118 Crawford
offered no substantial reasons for the law to stop here in
com/2007/08/opportunity-for-cross-examination-at.html; Richard Friedman,
Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Feb. 11,
2005), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/02/prior-opportunity-forcross.html.
112
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 152 (1970).
113
Cf. Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 154–56 (Fla. 2008) (holding
that a “discovery deposition” does not constitute a prior opportunity for
cross-examination under Crawford).
114
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
115
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 158–59 (1878).
116
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359–61 (2008).
117
Cf. id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (indicating that
confrontation forfeiture should be triggered by an intent “to thwart the
judicial process,” or to “isolate the victim from outside help, including the
aid of law enforcement and the judicial process”).
118
See Mosteller, supra note 97, at 516.
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considering practical confrontation priorities consistent with an
adversary process.119 For example, if the defendant did not
absent the unavailable declarant, one fairly might ask whether
the prosecution had any opportunity to supply even pre-trial
examination of the declarant. If the prosecution sat on its hands
pending trial, or chose to deny the defense pre-trial access to the
declarant through discovery limitations, the prosecution will
have lost its claim to necessity and equity for introducing the
now-unavailable declarant’s statement at trial. But on the other
hand, the prosecution’s demonstrated inability to offer even pretrial examination of an unavailable declarant should be a relevant
consideration to a fair adversary process. Dying declarations
certainly could qualify for this consideration,120 as could victims
or witnesses who evade the prosecution’s diligent efforts to
locate them.
In this circumstance, before excluding the testimonial
evidence altogether, a court could prioritize exploring whether a
fair adversary process still could be preserved without crossexamination of the unavailable declarant. For example, the court
could order the prosecution to produce witnesses with detailed
personal knowledge of the unavailable declarant and how the
119

Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72–75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(reviewing historical record and concluding, “I am not convinced that the
Confrontation Clause categorically requires exclusion of testimonial
statements”); cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849–50 (1990) (holding
that face-to-face confrontation is a preferred but not indispensible part of trial
confrontation, and thus modified confrontation procedures can be employed
when necessary, equitable, and fair); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022–25
(1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (accepting face-to-face confrontation as a
confrontation priority, but recognizing that necessity and equity can justify
alternative procedures that do not deny the defendant the opportunity to test
the evidence in an adversary process).
120
I always have found “necessity and equity” as the most persuasive
argument for admitting a dying declaration over a confrontation objection—
the prosecution simply has no ability to produce this witness for anyone to
examine, including the prosecution itself, at any time. The argument that a
dying declaration uniquely should be admissible over a confrontation
objection solely because of its greater antiquity than other hearsay exceptions,
cf. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (identifying historical bases for testimonial dying
declarations), too categorically and arbitrarily preferences the old over the
new in the development of the law.
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statement was made;121 condition admission on robust pre-trial
discovery or deposition to enhance defense preparedness for this
evidence; relax the evidentiary foundations for relevant
impeachment of the non-testifying declarant or rebuttal of the
declarant’s statement;122 instruct the jury and permit defense
argument on the risks of this kind of evidence;123 or hold a pretrial hearing to evaluate whether the evidence presents any
unique risks of unreliability that cannot be confronted fairly
without the declarant on the witness stand for crossexamination.124
This approach recognizes that, in carrying the burden of
proof, prosecuting lawyers determine whether trial evidence is
testimonial by how they employ it against the defendant at trial.
The defendant, however, also is represented by diligent trial
counsel in an adversary process. In necessary and equitable
circumstances, competent defense counsel properly may be
expected to confront prosecution testimony with more than just
the tool of cross-examination if the law treats confrontation as a
part of a fair adversary process and not just a rule of evidence
admissibility.
By embracing some flexibility in how confrontation rights
are enforced, I do not mean to minimize the centrality of crossexamination to this right. Crawford properly ranks crossexamination at trial as the highest confrontation priority.
121

See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that while the prosecution did not
produce the declarant of the testimonial report, “a knowledgeable
representative of the laboratory was present to testify and to explain the lab’s
processes and the details of the report”).
122
See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning the
Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1524–26 (2008).
123
See id. at 1528. Courts already instruct juries in this manner with
other types of potentially problematic or unreliable evidence, such as
cooperating witness testimony, interested witness testimony, missing
testimony from an uncalled and knowledgeable witness, and identification
evidence. Rather than exclude this evidence altogether, the law trusts that a
well-informed jury in an adversary system can weigh the evidence
appropriately. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012).
124
Cf. Smith, Jr., supra note 122, at 1528.
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Moreover, my approach severely would restrict the
prosecution’s ability to proceed without producing an available
declarant, and it further would acknowledge that defendants
retain confrontation interests even when the prosecution has a
strong case for proceeding without an unavailable declarant. But
the point of the confrontation right is an opportunity to test the
prosecution’s evidence as an adversary. Confrontation should not
be an all-or-nothing evidence admissibility rule that, while
reflecting some views of history, ignores how criminal cases can
be tried—and how judges are likely to decide confrontation cases
when given an all-or-nothing choice. By imposing an all-ornothing choice, Crawford’s commitment to a binary
confrontation framework seems to assure less confrontation, not
more: Crawford incentivizes a narrow view of the testimonial
evidence subject to exclusion, and permits a broad universe of
non-testimonial evidence that legislatures and courts are free to
admit at trial without any concern for confrontation priorities.
I recognize that my suggested vision for confrontation rights
may invite some of the vices of Roberts. But Crawford is doing
no better, and perhaps even worse, at reducing judicial
discretion and decision making uncertainty. Whatever the vices
of my proposed approach to confrontation, it at least offers the
competing virtue of honestly acknowledging real-world equity in
solving confrontation problems in an adversary system. Judges
already are acknowledging these concerns, just under the guise
of Crawford’s testimonial evidence framework. Judges by
necessity are narrowing the definition of the right, rather than
exploring practical ways to prioritize that right’s enforcement. I
would rather see this judicial discretion exercised in how
confrontation is enforced, not in whether that right exists.
IV. CONCLUSION
If my assessment of the trajectory of confrontation law is
accurate, one has to ask what the contribution of Crawford has
been to constitutional criminal procedure. No doubt, Roberts had
become a fairly empty confrontation framework that needed
some meaningful constitutional discipline imposed on it. Yet the
Supreme Court needs to be cautious about disrupting prevalent
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rules of criminal trial procedure without some clear sense of
where that constitutional project is going, and a judicial
commitment to get there. That commitment apparently did not
exist for Crawford.
Chief Justice Rehnquist thus raised an important question in
Crawford: In the world of criminal practice, does a shot at
perfection justify an extended and uncertain journey, perhaps to
no better a place, or even to someplace worse? I do not know an
overarching answer to this question. But in retrospect, Chief
Justice Rehnquist made a pretty good case for a more modest
effort to refine confrontation doctrine in Crawford—perhaps
such as bundling a more robust unavailability requirement into
Roberts.125 An effort of this sort may not have promised
confrontation perfection, even from the beginning. But it would
have improved Roberts, avoided years of uncertainty in how
criminal cases are to be tried, and in the end, may have proved
about as good as where Crawford appears to have delivered us.

125

See generally Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1016–17 (1988) (reviewing the
weakening of the unavailability requirement under Roberts).

